

The Optimal Distribution of Income Revisited

Ray C. Fair*

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Abstract

This paper revisits the optimal distribution of income model in Fair (1971). This model is the same as in Mirrlees (1971) except that education is also a decision variable and tax rates are restricted to lie on a tax function. In the current paper the tax-rate restriction is relaxed. As in Fair (1971), a numerical method is used. The current method uses the DFP algorithm with numeric derivatives. Because no analytic derivatives have to be taken, it is easy to change assumptions and functional forms and run alternative experiments. The sensitivity of the results to the four main assumptions of the model are examined. Gini coefficients are computed, which provides a metric for comparing the redistributive effects under different assumptions. Ten optimal marginal tax rates are computed per experiment corresponding to ten tax brackets.

This paper also argues that the widely used specification of a quasi-linear utility function—a utility function with no income effects—is not realistic. It requires for solution of the overall model large differences in utility functions across individuals of different abilities.

*Cowles Foundation, Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8281. e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website: *fairmodel.econ.yale.edu*. Without implicating anyone, I am indebted to the following people for helpful answers to questions: Joe Altonji, Momi Dahan, Peter Diamond, Fatih Guvenen, Etienne Lehmann, Sharon Oster, Emmanuel Saez, and Danny Yagan. A FORTRAN computer program is available from the author that does all the calculations described in this paper. This program can be used to run alternative experiments from those discussed in this paper.

1 Introduction

Mirrlees' (1971) classic paper analyzes optimal marginal tax rates and lump sum redistribution in a setting in which the government maximizes a social welfare function in the face of individual optimization behavior. An individual chooses his or her labor supply to maximize utility, taking as given his or her wage rate, the tax rates, and the lump sum transfer payment. Assumptions need to be made about the distribution of wage rates, the form of the utility functions, and the form of the social welfare function. The key question for Mirrlees and the large literature that followed is how the optimal rates vary with income. In the original simulations, Mirrlees came to two somewhat surprising conclusions: optimal tax rates may decline at high income levels, and a constant tax rate for all incomes may be close to optimal. But as Mirrlees himself concluded, these conclusions are sensitive to the underlying assumptions.

In the literature since Mirrlees there is still no agreement on his first proposition. Diamond (1998) found optimal marginal tax rates were U-shaped, but Dahan and Strawczynski (2000) showed that this result is sensitive to replacing linear by logarithmic utility of consumption. Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) argue that optimal marginal tax rates are likely to decline with income, whereas Diamond and Saez (2011) argue the opposite.

The basic setup in Fair (1971) is the same as in Mirrlees (1971) except that education is a decision variable and a single parameter of a tax-rate function with rising marginal tax rates is computed (plus the lump sum transfer) rather than many unrestricted tax rates. In Mirrlees (1971) the distribution of wage rates is exogenous, whereas in Fair (1971) the distribution of ability is exogenous and an individual's wage rate depends on his or her ability and hours of education. A central focus in Fair (1971) was on how the optimal government tax policy changes the income distribution—Gini coefficients. The literature following Mirrlees was mostly concerned with optimal tax rates, but it is straightforward after the optimization to

compute Gini coefficients or other income-distribution parameters.

In the current paper I return to this basic setup with education as a decision variable, but relax the assumption of a tax-rate function, allowing flexibility in the number of marginal tax rates chosen. I also use a flexible solution method—the DFP algorithm with numeric derivatives. This requires that no analytic derivatives be taken—unlike many papers in this literature, this paper is not filled with first-order conditions and Lagrangians! This allows one to consider alternative cases with only a few coding changes. One can easily examine the sensitivity of the optimal marginal tax rates to alternative assumptions about the the social welfare function, the individual utility functions, the ability distribution, and the returns to education.

Regarding the incorporation of education in the static model, there are only a few studies that take education hours as a decision variable on a par with hours worked. Tuomala (1990, Chapter 7) considers education, but there are no foregone earnings from education. The only cost to education is that it enters negatively in the utility function. In Diamond and Mirrlees (2002) labor hours and human capital investment are individual decision variables. Increasing either increases wage income, and both enter individually in the utility function with negative effects. Brett and Weymark (2003) also take education as an individual decision variable. Education is free and is financed from general tax revenues. In Bovenberg and Jacobs (2011) education is an investment cost but does not subtract from hours worked. Also, the government observes education in their model. Dynamic models that include education or human capital accumulation include Kapička (2006), da Costa and Maestri (2007), Best and Kleven (2013), Kapička (2015), and Stantcheva (2015). In Fair (1971) and in the analysis below education hours are not observed by the government and they subtract from total hours available for work.

The main conclusions are as follows. Lognormal distributions of ability lead to declining marginal tax rates at the top. Adding a Pareto tail leads to a higher tax rate in the top bracket relative to the other brackets. As the social welfare

function weights low income individuals more, tax rates increase. There is huge redistribution if the social welfare function is Rawlsian. Eliminating education as a decision variable leads to higher tax rates since there are then no negative tax-rate effects on education. As the risk aversion parameter increases in the utility functions, which means faster declining marginal utility with income, the tax rates increase and there is more redistribution. OECD results match best for a risk aversion parameter between 0.75 and 1.00.

Finally, the paper argues that the quasi-linear utility function, as in Diamond (1998), is not compatible with solution of the overall model unless the weight on leisure in the utility functions varies inversely with ability.

2 The Model

Overview

The model is timeless. I prefer to set it up as a lifetime model rather than a model for one year, but this is simply a matter of interpretation. There is no wealth and no saving. An individual's utility function is a function of after-tax income and leisure, where leisure is total hours minus hours worked minus education hours. Individuals choose hours of work and education hours to maximize lifetime utility, given ability, the tax system, and the rate of return to education. The wage rate depends on ability and education.

The government has a social welfare function (SWF) in the individual utilities and chooses the tax system to maximize this SWF. The tax system consists of tax rates by income categories. The budget constraint implies that all taxes are returned to the individuals as lump sum transfers—each individual gets $1/n$ of total taxes, where n is the number of individuals. For the numerical results below n is taken to be 999. The tax system is used only for redistribution, although one could add government expenditure to be financed by taxes.

General Equations

The lifetime utility function for each individual is

$$u_i = f(y_i, T - h_i - e_i), \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (1)$$

where u_i is utility, y_i is after-tax income, h_i is the number of hours worked, e_i is the number of hours spent in education, and T is the total number of hours in an individual's working or education life. Note that the function f is assumed to be the same for each individual, which is the standard assumption in this literature. As discussed in Section 4, this assumption is not compatible with f being quasi-linear. The wage rate for each individual is determined by the earnings function:

$$w_i = g(a_i, e_i), \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (2)$$

where w_i is the wage rate and a_i is ability. Before-tax income, y_i^* , is

$$y_i^* = w_i h_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (3)$$

After-tax income is

$$y_i = y_i^* - t(y_i^*) + k, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (4)$$

where $t(y_i^*)$ is the tax schedule—the amount of tax collected from an individual with before-tax income y_i^* —and k is the lump sum amount transferred to each individual by the government. The tax schedule consists of marginal tax rates by income category.

The social welfare function of the government is

$$SWF = z(u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n) \quad (5)$$

The budget constraint of the government is

$$n \cdot k = \sum_{i=1}^n t(y_i^*) \quad (6)$$

The decision of the government is to choose the tax schedule to maximize SWF subject to the budget constraint and to the fact that individuals maximize utility. Individuals take the tax schedule and k as given and choose h_i and e_i to maximize utility subject to equations (2), (3), and (4).

Solution Method

It is possible to use an algorithm like Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP)—Davidon (1959) and Fletcher and Powell (1963)—and numeric derivatives to solve many nonlinear optimization problems. I have used it in Fair (1974) to solve large optimal control problems, of up to 239 control variables. This procedure—DFP with numeric derivatives—is used in this paper. The advantage of using numeric derivatives is that no analytic derivatives have to be taken, which makes it trivial to change functional forms and reoptimize. Given the sensitivity of results to functional forms, this feature of the method is very useful.

The overall solution is as follows. There are two decision variables per individual— h_i and e_i —and n optimization problems in total, one per individual. This is n uses of the DFP algorithm. Call this the “level 1” solution. The decision variables of the government are the marginal tax rates in the tax schedule, say 10 of them. The DFP algorithm is also used to find the optimal marginal tax rates, subject to the budget constraint (6). Call this the “level 2” solution.

The use of the DFP algorithm with numeric derivatives simply requires that a program (subroutine) be written that computes the value of the objective function for given set of values of the decision variables. For the level 1 solution for a given individual i , the subroutine computes u_i for given values of h_i and e_i , conditional on the tax schedule and k . This is all the DFP algorithm needs to find the optimal values of h_i and e_i , given a_i and the utility functions. Function evaluations are used in computing the numeric derivatives and in the search process.

The function evaluation for the level 2 solution is a little more involved. It computes SWF for a given tax schedule. Embedded in this evaluation is the

level 1 solution, which requires n uses of the DFP algorithm. The complication for the level 2 solution is that for a given tax schedule, the lump sum transfer k requires the n values of h_i and e_i , but the optimal values of the h_i 's and e_i 's depend on k . An iterative technique was used to solve this problem. Initial values of h_i and e_i were used to compute k (given a tax schedule); the n uses of the DFP algorithm were used to compute the level 1 solution; k was recomputed using the computed values of h_i and e_i ; the level 1 solution was computed again; etc. The process was stopped when the difference between successive values of k was within a prescribed tolerance level. At the stopping point optimal values of h_i and e_i have been computed for the given tax schedule (within the tolerance level of the budget constraint), from which the values of u_i can be computed and thus SWF . This is one function evaluation for the level 2 solution, which is all the DFP algorithm needs. The level 2 solution yields optimal values of the marginal tax rates (and k).

Specific Equations for the Base Case

Given the above setup, it should be clear that it is easy to use alternative functional forms. Each change just requires a different line of code. The following is the base-line specification.

Working or education years are assumed to be between the ages of 18 and 70 (53 years). Sleep requirements are assumed to be 8 hours per day, so the total number of non-sleep hours (T) is $53 \times 365.25 \times 16 = 309,732.$, which is rounded to 300 thousand hours. A year of education is assumed to take 8 hours per day times 20 days per month times 12 months = 1,920 hours, which is rounded to 2 thousand hours.

In the base case, ability a_i is assumed to be log normally distributed with mean $\log(25)$ and standard deviation 0.5. The wage function is

$$\log w_i = \log a_i + \rho \log\left(\frac{e_i}{2} + 1\right) \quad (7)$$

If $e_i = 0$, then the wage rate is just equal to the ability value. The wage rate is in

units of dollars per hour. The rate of return to education, ρ , is taken to be 0.12. A year of education (2 thousand hours) increases w_i by 12 percent.

If an individual works 8 hours a day, 20 days a month, 12 months a year for 53 years, this is 101.760 thousand hours, which is rounded to 100 thousand hours. At a wage rate of \$25 per hour, this is lifetime before-tax income of \$2.5 million dollars, or an average of about \$47 thousand per year.

The base-case utility function is taken to be logarithmic in after-tax income and leisure:

$$u_i = \log y_i + \beta \log(T - h_i - e_i) \quad (8)$$

This is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function, with risk aversion parameter of 1.0. It will be denoted CRRA (1.00). The parameter β is the same across individuals. Its choice is discussed below.

The social welfare function is postulated to be:

$$SWF = \sum_{i=1}^n \log u_i \quad (9)$$

If the government could chose utility for each individual with no constraints, the optimum would be complete equality of utility.

If taxes were proportional, the tax function would be:

$$t(y_i^*) = t_1 y_i^*, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (10)$$

where t_1 is the proportional tax rate. If instead, say, 10 tax rates were chosen, there would be 10 brackets: $b_1 - 0, b_2 - b_1, \dots, b_{10} - b_9$, where b_{10} is larger than the income of any individual. The choice of brackets is discussed below.

Robustness Options

As noted above, it is easy to change assumptions and reoptimize. Some of the options are as follows.

- Different utility functions can be used. Four other CRRA functions are considered below, with risk aversion parameters of 0.50, 0.75, 1.25, and 1.50 respectively. These will be denoted CRRA (0.50), CRRA (0.75), CRRA (1.25), and CRRA (1.50) respectively.
- Different distributions of a_i can be used. Two other distributions are considered below: a lognormal distribution with a standard deviation of 0.6 rather than 0.5, and a Pareto tail with parameter 1.5 spliced to the lognormal distribution with standard deviation 0.5 at the 95th percentile.
- For education, different values of ρ can be used. Also, a different wage function can be used, and education can be dropped from the model. The case of no education is considered below.
- Different tax brackets can be used, including more or fewer than 10. For each set of the other assumptions, two cases are considered below: 1) one proportional tax and 2) 10 tax brackets. The choice of the brackets is explained below.
- A different SWF can be used, for example the sum of utilities instead of the sum of the log of utilities and a Rawlsian utility function. Both of these functions are considered below. Also considered is a SWF that excludes the top 10 percent of income earners.

Gini Coefficients

Although the literature following Mirrlees (1971) has not focused on the optimal income distribution, it is straightforward to compute Gini coefficients once a solution has been obtained. The two Gini coefficients of interest are the one corresponding to before-tax income, y_i^* , and the one corresponding to after-tax income, y_i . These will be denoted g^* and g respectively. It is of interest to see how much the Gini coefficient is lowered by the government's tax policy. Note that the Gini

coefficients as is usual are in income, not utility. As a result, g is not a decision variable of the government but a result of its policy.

Returns to Education

As noted above, the return to a year of education has been taken to be 12 percent. This number can, of course, be changed for the calculations. From Table 5 in Card's (1999) survey article, a return of 10 percent seems roughly consistent with the literature. Since the present analysis pertains to lifetime variables, I have chosen to use a slightly higher return of 12 percent.

In Fair (1971) nine earnings functions were postulated, given data at the time, where an individual's productivity depended on his or her ability and education. These functions were then approximated by a polynomial function to get an earnings function. In this work the effect of education on an individual's productivity depended positively on his or her ability. In the present paper the earnings function is simpler, and the return to education in percent terms does not vary with ability.

Note that no cost to education has been built into the model except foregone earnings. Such costs could be added, but it is unlikely that this would make much difference to the analysis.

The Utility Functions

Consider first the choice of β in the utility function (8). If there is no education ($e_i = 0$) and no taxes ($y_i = w_i h_i$), then maximizing u_i with respect to h_i yields optimal hours h_i^*

$$h_i^* = \frac{T}{1 + \beta} \quad (11)$$

In the calibration of the model T is 300. A ballpark value of hours worked is 100, which is roughly 8 hours a day, 20 days a month, 12 months a year, 53 years (divided by a thousand). β was thus chosen to be 2, which gives a value of h_i^* of 100 in (11).

The value of h_i^* does not depend on the wage rate. The log function in (8) has the feature that if income is all wage income, an uncompensated change in the wage rate has no effect on hours worked. If, however, part of income is nonwage income, the number of hours worked does depend on the wage rate. Consider (8) where there is no e_i and $y_i = (1 - t_1)w_i h_i + k$, where t_1 is the proportional tax rate and k is a lump sum transfer (exogenous to the individual). Then taking the derivative of u_i with respect to h_i and setting it equal to zero yields optimal hours, h_i^* :

$$h_i^* = \frac{T}{1 + \beta} - \frac{k}{(1 + \beta)(1 - t_1)w_i} \quad (12)$$

The derivative of h_i^* with respect to t_1 is $-\frac{k}{(1 + \beta)(1 - t_1)^2 w_i}$, which is negative. So an increase in the tax rate lowers hours worked. The derivative of h_i^* with respect to k is $-\frac{1}{(1 + \beta)(1 - t_1)w_i}$, which is also negative. So an increase in the lump sum transfer also lowers hours worked.

The other four utility functions have the form:

$$u_i = \frac{y_i^{1-\theta}}{1 - \theta} + \beta \frac{(T - h_i - e_i)^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \quad (13)$$

where θ and γ are coefficients of relative risk aversion. This equation reduces to (8) when θ and γ are one. For CRRA (0.50), θ and γ are 0.50; for CRRA (0.75), they are 0.75; for CRRA (1.25), they are 1.25; and for CRRA (1.50), they are 1.50. The larger is θ , the faster does marginal utility decrease with income.

For these four utility functions the optimal value of hours worked depends on the wage rate, contrary for the utility function (8). This makes the choice of β more complicated. β was chosen as follows. For each function the equation for the optimal value of hours was derived for the no-education, no-tax case. In the calibration the value of ability (which is the wage rate with no education and no taxes) of the median individual is 25, and so β was chosen to have the optimal value of hours be 100 at a wage rate of 25. These values for the four functions are 7.071, 3.76, 1.0636, and 0.566, respectively.

It is interesting to note for these choices how the optimal value of hours changes as ability changes. For the lognormal distribution of ability with a mean of $\log(25)$ and a standard deviation of 0.5, the ability of the lowest ranked individual—1—is 5.33 and the ability of the highest ranked individual—999—is 117.21. (The median ability—individual 500—is 25.) For CRRA (0.50) the optimal hours for individuals 1, 500, and 999 are 28.9, 100.0, and 210.3. For CRRA (0.75) they are 69.0, 100.0, and 136.7. For CRRA (1.25) they are 121.5, 100.0, and 80.6. For CRRA (1.50) they are 136.7, 100.0, 69.0. These are all for the no-education, no-tax case. The range for CRRA (0.50) is large, and it will be seen that this is a problematic function, as is CRRA (1.50).

When there are no taxes (and no lump sum) and the utility function is CRRA (1.00), everyone works the same amount and has the same amount of education. As θ and γ deviate from 1.00 in either direction, the range of hours worked and education across ability gets wider. When the parameters are less than one, higher ability individuals work more and get more education, and vice versa when the parameters are greater than one.

The Social Welfare Functions

Maximizing the SWF in (9) is equivalent to maximizing the product of utilities. Another option is simply to maximize the sum:

$$SWF = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i \quad (14)$$

Another option is the Rawls case, where the utility of the lowest ability individual is maximized:

$$SWF = u_1 \quad (15)$$

A fourth SWF was also used, which is (9) except that the top 10 percent of the individuals are not counted. The summation is from 1 to $.9n$.

The Tax Brackets

The tax brackets were chosen to correspond to roughly 10 percent of the population in each bracket. For each set of assumptions (each table below), the optimal proportional tax rate was first computed (t_1), i.e., just one tax rate. For this run the 999 individuals were ranked by before-tax income, and the 10 brackets were chosen by picking the income of individual 100 to end the first bracket, the income of individual 200 to end the second, up to the income of individual 900 to end the ninth. The top income for the tenth bracket was taken to be in effect infinite. The marginal tax rates are thus roughly for the first decile, the second decile, and so on.

A Note on the DFP Algorithms

The fact that the overall DFP algorithm requires the use of another DFP algorithm to compute the objective function leads to some accuracy issues when numeric derivatives are used. In some cases, especially when 10 tax rates are computed, the objective function is fairly flat, and some of the results were sensitive to starting points. The general pattern of the optimal marginal tax rates by income was not sensitive, but the accuracy to three, and sometimes two, decimal points was. For each run I tried a number of starting points and chose the one that led to the largest value of the objective function. I don't think any of the main points below are affected by these accuracy issues. Remember, however, that the numerical procedure is limited to considering values of the risk aversion parameter between about 0.50 and 1.50.

Top and Bottom Tax Rates

The question of whether the optimal marginal tax rate is zero for the lowest and highest income individuals is not an issue in this paper because of the use of brackets. There is no one tax rate for the highest income individual, nor for the

lowest income individual. Also, for some of the experiments the lowest income individual does not work.

3 The Results

There are a large number of options that can be run. With say 5 utility functions, 3 distributions of a_i , education or no education, 2 tax schedules, and 4 social welfare functions, there are 240 possible runs. There is also considerable output per run. For each run there are 999 values for each variable pertaining to an individual plus the tax-rate values and the Gini coefficients.

Before considering the results in detail, it will be useful to present a summary of the sensitivity of the optimal marginal tax rates to the various assumptions. This is done in Table 1. t_1 is the tax rate when there is only one tax parameter, and t_{10}/t_5 is the ratio of the 90th percentile marginal tax rate to the 50th percent marginal tax rate when 10 tax rates are computed. Part I of the table shows that as the risk aversion parameter increases, the overall tax rate increases, as does the ratio of the top rate to the 50th percentile rate. As the risk aversion parameter increases, marginal utility decreases faster with income, which encourages redistribution.

Part II of Table 1 shows that as the ability distribution becomes more skewed to the right, the higher is the overall tax rate and the ratio of the top rate to the 50th percentile rate. For the lognormal distributions the ratio is less than one, but for the Pareto tail the ratio is considerably above one. This result is consistent with the results in Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009). For all the runs in this study, the top rate was lower than the other rates when a lognormal distribution was used and higher when the Pareto tail was used.

Part III of Table 1 shows that as the SWF weights low income individuals more, the overall tax rate rises, as does the ratio. As expected, when the top 10 percent are excluded from the SWF, they are taxed more. The Rawls case leads to a very high tax rate. Although not shown in the table, for the Rawls case 130 individuals

Table 1
Overview of Results

Part I		
lognormal (0.5), SWF is Sum of Logs, Education yes		
Risk Aversion Parameter	t_1	t_{10}/t_5
CRRA (0.50)	0.210	NA
CRRA (0.75)	0.227	0.730
CRRA (1.00)	0.248	0.761
CRRA (1.25)	0.317	0.834
CRRA (1.50)	0.323	NA
Part II		
CRRA (1.00), SWF is Sum of Logs, Education yes		
Ability Distribution		
lognormal (0.5)	0.248	0.761
lognormal (0.6)	0.312	0.752
Pareto tail	0.316	2.049
Part III		
CRRA (1.00), lognormal (0.5), Education yes		
SWF		
Sum	0.241	0.725
Sum of Logs	0.248	0.761
Exclude top 10 percent	0.295	0.947
Rawls	0.542	NA
Part IV		
CRRA (1.00), lognormal (0.5), SWF is Sum of Logs		
Education		
yes	0.248	0.761
no	0.255	0.763

t_1 = one overall tax rate

t_{10}/t_5 = ratio of 90th percentile tax rate to 50th percentile tax rate

NA = no solution

When the top 10 percent are excluded, the SWF is the sum of logs

do not work, and 223 individuals do not take any education.

Finally, Part IV of Table 1 shows the effects of education. When education is not a decision variable, the overall tax rate is higher, as is the ratio. This is as expected, since with no education possibilities there is one less way for individuals to respond to tax changes—one less disincentive.

I now turn to a more detailed examination of the results. Twelve runs are discussed, the first six using tables. The results reported in the tables for each run are the two Gini coefficients, g and g^* ; the 10 marginal tax values, t_1, \dots, t_{10} ; the ratio of the lump sum transfer to median before-tax income, k/y_{500}^* ; the first individual for whom h is not zero, $\#h$; h for individuals 25, 500, and 975, h_{25} , h_{500} , and h_{975} ; the same four variables for e , $\#e$, e_{25} , e_{500} , and e_{975} ; the ratio of the ability of the top individual to that of the bottom individual, a_{999}/a_1 ; and the same for after-tax income and utility, y_{999}/y_1 and u_{999}/u_1 .

For ease of discussion, individuals in the bottom 10 percent of the ability distribution will be called “poor,” and those in the top 10 percent will be called “rich”.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00)

Table 2 contains the results for the base case: lognormal distribution with standard deviation of 0.5, CRRA (1.00), and SWF as the sum of the log of the utilities. Column (1) is the run with no taxes and transfers; column (2) is the column for one tax rate; and column (3) is for 10 marginal tax rates.

In column (1), with no taxes, everyone works the same number of hours and has the same number of hours of education— $h = 96.8$ and $e = 9.6$. The ratio of the ability of the top individual to the bottom is 21.98. In column (2), with one tax rate, the rate is 0.248 and the ratio of the lump sum transfer to median before-tax income is 0.289. Hours worked increases with ability, as does education. The

Table 2
Solution Results
Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00)

	Number of tax brackets		
	0	1	10
	(1)	(2)	(3)
g	0.275	0.258	0.270
g^*	0.275	0.342	0.357
$g - g^*$	0	-0.084	-0.087
t_1	0	0.248	0.268
t_2	0		0.268
t_3	0		0.269
t_4	0		0.267
t_5	0		0.264
t_6	0		0.260
t_7	0		0.256
t_8	0		0.248
t_9	0		0.237
t_{10}	0		0.201
k/y_{500}^*	0	0.289	0.308
$\#h$	1	3	4
h_{25}	96.8	42.0	36.8
h_{500}	96.8	77.7	76.5
h_{975}	96.8	89.7	92.6
$\#e$	1	7	10
e_{25}	9.6	3.0	2.4
e_{500}	9.6	7.3	7.2
e_{975}	9.6	8.8	9.1
a_{999}/a_1	21.98	21.98	21.98
y_{999}/y_1	21.98	15.90	16.01
u_{999}/u_1	1.182	1.108	1.107

g = Gini coefficient

t = marginal tax rate

k = lump sum transfer

h = number of hours worked

e = number of education hours

a = ability

y^* = before-tax income

y = after-tax income

u = utility

Table 3
Solution Results
Pareto Tail, CRRA (1.00)

	Number of tax brackets		
	0	1	10
	(1)	(2)	(3)
g	0.346	0.320	0.273
g^*	0.346	0.467	0.421
$g - g^*$	0	-0.147	-0.148
t_1	0	0.316	0.257
t_2	0		0.265
t_3	0		0.266
t_4	0		0.266
t_5	0		0.263
t_6	0		0.261
t_7	0		0.257
t_8	0		0.251
t_9	0		0.242
t_{10}	0		0.539
k/y_{500}^*	0	0.434	0.385
$\#h$	1	17	9
h_{25}	96.8	8.2	23.1
h_{500}	96.8	68.8	72.7
h_{975}	96.8	89.3	68.5
$\#e$	1	40	21
e_{25}	9.6	0.0	0.8
e_{500}	9.6	6.3	6.7
e_{975}	9.6	8.7	6.2
a_{999}/a_1	144.73	144.73	144.73
y_{999}/y_1	144.73	71.59	51.74
u_{999}/u_1	1.293	1.187	1.171

See notes to Table 2

Table 4
Solution Results
Lognormal (0.6), CRRA (1.00)

	Number of tax brackets		
	0	1	10
	(1)	(2)	(3)
g	0.327	0.302	0.317
g^*	0.327	0.438	0.456
$g - g^*$	0	-0.136	-0.139
t_1	0	0.312	0.321
t_2	0		0.328
t_3	0		0.329
t_4	0		0.329
t_5	0		0.327
t_6	0		0.329
t_7	0		0.325
t_8	0		0.317
t_9	0		0.303
t_{10}	0		0.246
k/y_{500}^*	0	0.397	0.414
$\#h$	1	30	37
h_{25}	96.8	0.0	0.0
h_{500}	96.8	70.7	69.4
h_{975}	96.8	89.0	93.0
$\#e$	1	58	65
e_{25}	9.6	0.0	0.0
e_{500}	9.6	6.5	6.3
e_{975}	9.6	8.7	9.2
a_{999}/a_1	40.78	40.78	40.78
y_{999}/y_1	40.78	16.03	17.02
u_{999}/u_1	1.222	1.107	1.109

See notes to Table 2

Table 5
Solution Results
Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (0.75)

	Number of tax brackets		
	0	1	10
	(1)	(2)	(3)
g	0.335	0.326	0.339
g^*	0.335	0.422	0.438
$g - g^*$	0.000	-0.096	-0.099
t_1	0	0.227	0.223
t_2	0		0.240
t_3	0		0.244
t_4	0		0.246
t_5	0		0.248
t_6	0		0.249
t_7	0		0.243
t_8	0		0.233
t_9	0		0.222
t_{10}	0		0.181
k/y_{500}^*	0.000	0.286	0.302
$\#h$	1	19	20
h_{25}	81.1	6.2	5.3
h_{500}	101.3	76.9	74.6
h_{975}	123.2	111.4	115.7
$\#e$	1	43	45
e_{25}	7.7	0.0	0.0
e_{500}	10.2	7.2	7.0
e_{975}	12.8	11.4	11.9
a_{999}/a_1	21.98	21.98	21.98
y_{999}/y_1	45.90	23.24	24.18
u_{999}/u_1	1.313	1.182	1.186

See notes to Table 2

Table 6
Solution Results
Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.25)

	Number of tax brackets		
	0	1	10
	(1)	(2)	(3)
g	0.236	0.212	0.222
g^*	0.236	0.310	0.325
$g - g^*$	0	-0.098	-0.103
t_1	0	0.317	0.341
t_2	0		0.340
t_3	0		0.339
t_4	0		0.336
t_5	0		0.332
t_6	0		0.328
t_7	0		0.325
t_8	0		0.313
t_9	0		0.296
t_{10}	0		0.277
k/y_{500}^*	0	0.358	0.378
$\#h$	1	1	2
h_{25}	106.4	48.7	43.5
h_{500}	94.2	74.6	73.8
h_{975}	82.8	77.4	79.3
$\#e$	1	4	6
e_{25}	10.8	3.8	3.2
e_{500}	9.3	7.0	6.9
e_{975}	7.9	7.3	7.5
a_{999}/a_1	21.98	21.98	21.98
y_{999}/y_1	14.12	9.97	9.99
u_{999}/u_1	7.246	2.085	2.026

See notes to Table 2

Table 7
Solution Results
Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00)
No Education

	Number of tax brackets		
	0	1	10
	(1)	(2)	(3)
g	0.275	0.251	0.261
g^*	0.275	0.337	0.350
$g - g^*$	0	-0.086	-0.089
t_1	0	0.255	0.264
t_2	0		0.271
t_3	0		0.273
t_4	0		0.274
t_5	0		0.274
t_6	0		0.273
t_7	0		0.270
t_8	0		0.262
t_9	0		0.247
t_{10}	0		0.209
k/y_{500}^*	0	0.297	0.313
$\#h$	1	1	2
h_{25}	100.0	44.0	41.4
h_{500}	100.0	79.0	77.4
h_{975}	100.0	92.1	95.3
$\#e$	-	-	-
e_{25}	0.0	0.0	0.0
e_{500}	0.0	0.0	0.0
e_{975}	0.0	0.0	0.0
a_{999}/a_1	21.98	21.98	21.98
y_{999}/y_1	21.98	15.06	15.48
u_{999}/u_1	1.183	1.110	1.110

See notes to Table 2

bottom 2 individuals do not work, and the bottom 6 do not choose any education.

In column (3), with 10 tax rates, the tax rates are higher than 0.248 for the bottom 70 percent and lower for the top 20 percent. The lump sum transfer is slightly higher than in column (2). Compared to column (2), the poor work less because of the higher tax rates and higher transfer, and the rich work more because of the lower tax rate. The poor educate themselves less, and the rich educate themselves more. In column (3) the Gini coefficient falls by 0.087, from 0.357 for before-tax income to 0.270 for after-tax income.

Pareto Tail, CRRA (1.00)

Table 3 is the same as Table 2 except the Pareto tail is used. As noted above, the Pareto distribution with a parameter of 1.5 was spliced to the lognormal distribution with a standard deviation of 0.5 at the 95th percentile level. This distribution is much different at the top than the lognormal. The ability ratio is 144.73 compared to 21.98 for the lognormal. With one tax rate in column (2), the tax rate is 0.316 compared to 0.248 in Table 2, and the lump sum ratio is 0.434 compared to 0.289. There is more redistribution—the Gini coefficient falls by 0.147.

With 10 tax rates, the tax rates are lower than 0.316 except for the top 10 percent, where the tax rate is 0.539. Compared to column (2), the high tax rate of 0.539 cuts the hours worked and education of the rich, but the very rich have high enough before-tax incomes for this to be optimal. Everyone else works more and gets more education because of the lower tax rates. The lump sum ratio is smaller—0.385 versus 0.434 in column (2). Comparing Tables 2 and 3, the lower tax rate for the rich in the lognormal case and the higher tax rate in the Pareto case is consistent, as noted above, with the results in Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009), Figure 3. It will be seen next that this result holds even for a lognormal distribution with a larger standard deviation.

Lognormal (0.6), CRRA (1.00)

Table 4 is the same as Table 2 except the standard deviation of the lognormal distribution is 0.6 rather than 0.5. The ability ratio is 40.78 versus 21.98 for 0.5. This is still, however, much lower than the ratio of 144.73 for the Pareto case. The tax rates are higher in Table 4 versus Table 2, as are the lump sum transfers. However, it is still the case that the tax rates fall for the upper part of the distribution. The general story is the same in Table 4 as in Table 2, but with more redistribution.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (0.75)

Table 5 is the same as Table 2 except that the utility function is CRRA (0.75). For this utility function compared to CRRA (1.00), marginal utility decreases less with income. With no taxes and transfers in column (1), hours worked and education increase with ability. Higher ability individuals work more than they do in Table 2 because their marginal utility does not decrease as much as they earn more income. Because of this, in column (1) the ratio of the top and bottom income is 45.90 compared to 21.98 in Table 2 where everyone works and educates themselves the same. As in Table 2, the tax rates are lower in column (3) at the higher incomes relative to the lower incomes. Overall, the tax rates are lower in Table 5 than in Table 2. Because marginal utility declines less with income than in Table 2, the optimum is for there to be less redistribution from the top incomes to the bottom.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.25)

Table 6 is the same as Table 2 except that the utility function is CRRA (1.25). In this case marginal utility decreases more with income. With no taxes and transfers in column (1) hours worked and education decrease with ability. The ratio of the top and bottom income is 14.12 compared to 21.98 in Table 2. The tax rates are higher in Table 6 versus Table 2. The optimum is now for there to be more redistribution from the top incomes to the bottom. However, the tax rate at the

top income bracket in column (3) is still lower compared to the other tax rates in column (3).

So, as expected, the results in Table 2 are in between those in Table 5 and 6.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), No Education

Table 7 is the same as Table 2 except there is no education. Except for t_1 in column (3), the tax rates are higher in Table 7 than in Table 2, and the lump sum transfers are slightly higher. There is a little more redistribution. This is as expected, since, as noted above, with no education possibilities there is one less way for individuals to respond to tax changes.

Some other runs that were computed are as follows. Tables are not presented to save space.

Pareto Tail, CRRA (0.75)

Comparing this run with Table 3 is similar to comparing Table 5 with Table 2. The tax rates are generally lower and there is more redistribution. The change in the Gini is -0.196 versus -0.148 in Table 3. The tax rate for the top 10 percent is higher than all the other tax rates, as in Table 3—0.542 versus a range of 0.203 to 0.271 for the others.¹ As in Table 3, the rich work more than the poor, and when there are no taxes and transfers the ratio of the top income to the bottom is 393.72! The bottom 76 (out of 999) do not work, and the bottom 135 do not choose any education.

Pareto Tail, CRRA (1.25)

Comparing this run with Table 3 is similar to comparing Table 6 with Table 2. The tax rates are generally higher and there is less redistribution. The change in the

¹For this case only 9 tax rates were computed, with the first bracket beginning with the income of the 20th percentile individual. There are too few working in the bottom 10 percent to get meaningful results.

Ginis is -0.126. The tax rate for the top 10 percent is higher than all the other tax rates, as in Table 3. In this case the rich work less than the poor, and with no taxes and transfers the ratio of the top income to the bottom is 68.07.

So again as expected, the results in Table 3 are in between those in these latter two runs. And for all the Pareto cases the tax rate for the top 10 percent is always higher than the others.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), SWF is the Sum of Utilities

This case is the same as Table 2 except SWF is the sum of utilities instead of the sum of the log of utilities. This change makes only a small difference. For 10 tax rates g is slightly larger—0.272 versus 0.270 in Table 2, and u_{999}/u_1 is slightly larger—1.108 versus 1.107. There is slightly more redistribution.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), SWF is (9) Excluding the Top 10 percent

This case is the same as Table 2 except that in the SWF the government does not care about the top 10 percent. In this case, as expected, the tax rates are higher than those in Table 2 and there is more redistribution. With 10 tax rates, g is 0.256 versus 0.270 in Table 2. The ratio of after-tax income of the top individual to the bottom is 13.03 versus 16.01 in Table 2. It is still the case, however, that the tax rate for the top 10 percent is lower than the tax rate for the rest of the distribution—0.287 versus about 0.310 for the rest. Even though the government does not care about the rich, it is still optimal to tax them less when the distribution is lognormal.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.00), SWF is Rawls

This case is the same as Table 2 except that the SWF is just u_1 . This change does make a large difference. With only one tax rate, the tax rate is 0.542 versus 0.248 in Table 2 and the lump sum ratio is 0.705 versus 0.289 in Table 2. The bottom 129 individuals do not work, and the bottom 223 do not choose any education.

The Gini coefficient falls from 0.511 for before-tax income to 0.234 for after-tax income. y_{999}/y_1 is 6.85 and u_{999}/u_1 is 1.063. Plato in *The Laws* thought that the former should be no larger than 4, so we are getting close. Trying to solve this case for several tax rates gave erratic results, but the main point using just one tax rate is clear.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (0.50)

This case is the same as Table 2 and Table 5 except that the utility function is CRRA (0.50). The one tax rate is 0.210, lower than in Tables 2 and 5. The results are more extreme than in Table 5. 116 individuals do not work, compared to 19 in column (2) in Table 5, and 191 do not take any education, compared to 43 in Table 5. h_{975} is 159.7 versus 111.4 in Table 5. The rich work more since their marginal utility decreases more slowly with income, and the optimum is for them to be taxed less (than in Table 5, where the utility function is CRRA (0.75)).

It was not possible in this case to compute 10 tax rates using the numerical procedure.

Lognormal (0.5), CRRA (1.50)

This case is the same as Table 2 and Table 6 except that the utility function is CRRA (1.50). In this case marginal utility decreases faster with income. The one tax rate is 0.323, higher than in Tables 2 and 6. In this case h_{975} is 71.1 versus 77.4 in Table 6. The rich work less since their marginal utility of income decreases faster with income, and the optimum is for them to be taxed more.

It was also not possible in this case to compute 10 tax rates.

4 Quasi-Linear Utility Function

Diamond (1998) examined the case of a quasi-linear utility function, a utility function with no income effects, and this function has become widely used in the literature. A recent example is Tsyvinski and Werquin (2017), who point out that this use is standard in the taxation literature. Assuming no education, in the present notation the quasi-linear function is

$$u_i = y_i + \nu(T - h_i) \quad (16)$$

where ν is strictly concave. Assume, for example, that the function is

$$u_i = y_i + \beta \log(T - h_i) \quad (17)$$

This function is the same as (8)—assuming no education—except for y_i replacing $\log y_i$.

Consider the case of no education and no taxes, so $y_i = w_i h_i$. For (8) maximizing u_i with respect to h_i yields optimal hours: $h_i^* = T/(1 + \beta)$, which is equation (11). For (17) optimal hours is:

$$h_i^* = T - \frac{\beta}{w_i} \quad (18)$$

In this case optimal hours depends on the wage rate, which is just ability with no education. For the lognormal distribution of ability with mean $\log(25)$ and standard deviation 0.5, which is the distribution used in the base case in this paper, individuals 1, 500, and 999 have ability 5.33, 25.00, and 117.21, respectively. (For the other two distributions used in this paper the range is wider.) For the utility functions (8) and (13) β was chosen such that in the case of no education and no taxes the optimal value of hours for individual 500 was 100, one-third of the value of T of 300. For CRRA (0.75), for example, the value of β was 3.76, which led to optimal hours for individual 1 of 69.0 and for individual 999 of 136.7.

The problem with utility function (17) is that there is no single value of β that yields sensible values of h_i^* for all individuals, given the distribution of w_i . For

example, a value of β of 5,000 and a value of w_{500} of 25, gives $h_{500}^* = 100$, one-third of T . This is as desired. But for $w_1 = 5.33$, $h_1^* = -638$, and for $w_{999} = 117.2$, $h_{999}^* = 257$. Even for a much smaller range of values of ability, it is not possible to get sensible values for optimal hours for all individuals. To get sensible values β would have to vary by individual—low ability individuals would have to have a low weight on leisure relative to high ability individuals—and this violates the common assumption in the literature of the same utility function for all. It could be that one could find a function ν in equation (16) that gave a sensible range of the values of optimal hours, but this seems unlikely given how far off the log function is.

In short, for what appear to be sensible distributions of ability, the quasi-linear utility function that does not vary by individual does not appear compatible with the solution of the optimal taxation problem.

As a final note, even for the CRRA (0.50) and CRRA (1.50) utility functions the solution can be problematic. One can't push the coefficients of relative risk aversion much beyond these values.

5 The Gini Coefficients

The OECD has computed for a number of countries Gini coefficients for market income and disposable income, roughly in this paper before-tax income and after-tax income. Table 8 shows results for 23 countries plus the OECD average of 29 countries. The market income Gini ranges from 0.323 for Korea to 0.523 for Chile. The disposable Gini ranges from 0.243 for Denmark to 0.496 for Chile. The changes in the two Ginis range from -0.023 for Korea to -0.152 for Belgium. The OECD averages for 29 countries are 0.304 and 0.407, for a change of -0.103. The average change is similar to the changes in Tables 2, 5, and 6, which pertain to the lognormal (0.5) distribution and the three CRRA utility functions. For column (3) in the three tables the changes are -0.087, -0.099, and -0.109, respectively.

Table 8
OECD Gini Coefficients
Data between 2006 and 2009

Country	Disposable Income	Market Income	Difference
Denmark	0.243	0.374	-0.131
Norway	0.256	0.376	-0.120
Belgium	0.256	0.408	-0.152
Finland	0.258	0.403	-0.145
Sweden	0.259	0.368	-0.109
Austria	0.261	0.406	-0.145
Switzerland	0.290	0.338	-0.048
France	0.292	0.431	-0.139
Netherlands	0.297	0.351	-0.054
Germany	0.300	0.420	-0.120
Korea	0.300	0.323	-0.023
Poland	0.310	0.435	-0.125
Spain	0.313	0.405	-0.092
New Zealand	0.323	0.403	-0.080
Japan	0.324	0.392	-0.068
Australia	0.324	0.418	-0.094
Canada	0.328	0.416	-0.088
Italy	0.334	0.465	-0.131
U.K.	0.345	0.456	-0.111
Portugal	0.347	0.458	-0.111
Israel	0.359	0.465	-0.106
U.S.	0.370	0.453	-0.083
Chile	0.496	0.523	-0.027
OECD(29)	0.304	0.407	-0.103

Source: OECD, "Divide We Stand: Why Inequality
Keeps Rising," 2011

Regarding the level of g , the values in the three tables are 0.270, 0.339, and 0.216. The OECD value of 0.304 is thus in between the values in Tables 2 and 5. Note that the Pareto results in Table 3 [and the Pareto results discussed above for CRRA (0.75) and CRRA (1.25)] have noticeably more redistribution than the OECD average.

6 Conclusion

The main conclusions from the results are the following.

- When the lognormal distribution of ability is used, the optimal marginal tax rates are always lower for the top income categories. When the Pareto tail is used, the optimal marginal tax rate for the top income bracket (top 10 percent) is always higher. There is considerably more redistribution for the Pareto than the lognormal.
- Regarding the SWF, it makes only a small difference whether the sum is over utilities or the log of utilities. If the top 10 percent are excluded, there is more redistribution, but the marginal tax rate for the top income bracket is still lower (for the lognormal distribution). There is huge redistribution when the SWF is Rawlsian, and the ratio of the top after-tax income to the bottom is only 6.85, close to Plato's 4.0.
- The results are as expected for education. The tax rates are higher and there is more redistribution when there is no education since there are then no negative tax-rate effects on education.
- The results are also as expected for the utility functions. The more does marginal utility decline with income, the higher are the tax rates and the more is there redistribution. The OECD results match best for the lognormal (0.5) distribution and a risk aversion parameter between 0.75 and 1.0.

- The quasi-linear utility function is not sensible in the present context unless it is assumed that low ability individuals weight leisure less than do high ability individuals. This has important implications for the literature, where the quasi-linear utility function is widely used.

Does this analysis have any guidance for public policy? There are, of course, many restrictive assumptions, especially the timeless nature of the analysis. There is no tagging power of the government, as in Akerlof (1978). There are no other taxes and just one government entity. Nevertheless, the results are firm in showing that for a lognormal distribution of ability it is optimal to tax the rich less. This is true across fairly different utility functions. It is also true even when the top 10 percent are excluded from the SWF. For a Pareto tail, the top tax rate is always greater than the others. So an important empirical question is which distribution of ability best approximates reality. The OECD results in Table 8 suggests that if the countries are optimizing, they are not using a Pareto distribution. The redistribution is not as large as a Pareto distribution would imply. Finally, the results suggest that if one could pin down the actual distribution of ability, the optimal marginal tax rates are not likely to be constant across income categories. If the distribution is close to lognormal, they are likely to decline at the top income brackets, and if the distribution has a Pareto tail, the tax rate at the top is likely to be higher.

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